Before the 2007 financial crisis, securitisation as an economic and legal construct had been developing dynamically in developed and developing countries, gaining significant impact on financial markets. The crisis, however, led to a breakdown in this sphere. Using data made available by the European Bank Authority and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe the scale of these measures was presented as well as the later image of securitisation in the USA and Europe. The paper then presents reasons which caused certain securitisation products irrespective of the pre-crisis rating level (even those rated ‘AAA’) to perform poorly during the crisis and reasons that hinder the development of securitisation in the post-crisis environment, especially in Europe, and which affected the relatively quick increase of US securitisation issuances and outstandings. This led to the need to look at attempts to revive securitisation in the European Union by relevant changes in the law, which would lead in particular to lowering the risk borne by investors and which would increase trust in securitisation, thus positively affecting its attractiveness. This is why the author analyses solutions adopted in Regulation 2017/24 (in force since January 1, 2019 and followed by other acts and documents related to securitisation) which introduces a general framework for securitisation and unified rules for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisation as a high quality securitisation, which is an opposite to complex, opaque and risky securitisation products available on the market. Particular attention is paid to due-diligence, risk-retention, transparency, simplicity and standardisation requirements that are imposed by the regulation.